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Single-room occupants (SRO's) are one of the most disadvantaged
groups in urban America.1 In the low-income hotels of large cities,2
each person occupies a solitary room without kitchen or bathroom
facilities. Since SRO's do not have written or oral leases for more than a
night, they may be evicted at the will of a public official or private
landlord. SRO's generally cannot afford standard housing units; the
average income of SRO's is about $1500 per year, far below the poverty
line.3 Since SRO's are usually elderly, physically ill, or poorly educated,
they lack the ability to increase their livelihood; many depend on
transfer payments or transitory labor markets for their insufficient
income.
As a disadvantaged group, SRO's need governmental aid to obtain
adequate shelter and subsistence. This Note will focus on the housing
needs of SRO's. In the past, municipalities have inadequately responded
to these needs through a policy of containment. By failing to build
proper housing, local officials have helped perpetuate one important
aspect of the intolerable, poverty-ridden environment in which most
SRO's are forced to live. In recent years, city governments have under-
taken a more active policy toward SRO's-clearance. Under the rubric
of urban renewal, local officials have torn down residential hotels with-
out providing enough replacements for these structures. Moreover,
the federal government has failed to develop construction programs
geared to SRO needs, while financially underwriting the demolition of
SRO housing.
Local and federal governments have neglected SRO's in part because
this sociological group is statistically invisible. Compared to the detailed
accounts of general housing conditions, reliable data on SRO's is
scarce.4 SRO's are also neglected because many are seen as socially
1. In the last comprehensive, national survey of SRO's in 1950, 54.7% of the single
men studied lived in substandard housing, as opposed to a general substandard rate for
the cities studied of 19.2%. D. BOGUE, SIm Row IN AMERICAN CrTEs (1963) [hereinafter
cited as BoGuE]. In the same year the rate for urban blacks, some of whom were SRO's,
was 60%. U.S. HOUSING AND HOME FINANCE AGENCY, OUR NONwHITrE POPULATION AND ITS
HousiNG Table 32 (Government Printing Office, 1963).
2. In 1950, there were forty-one cities with significant numbers of SRO's. Chicago
had the largest number of SRO's with over 20,000, while the average for the forty-one
cities was about 5,000. BOGUE, supra note 1, at 6.
3. Id. at 10-15.
4. Low-income hotels are frequently overlooked by the Bureau of the Census, which
is oriented toward "normal" dwellings like apartments and one-family houses. The Census
cannot provide accurate estimates of hotel residency since it groups SRO's indiscriminately
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deviant.5 Since most members of nuclear families do not understand the
life-style of SRO's, many Americans do not perceive the important social
functions played by residential hotels and put these dwellings into the
loosely defined category of "slums." Finally, SRO's are ignored because
they are powerless. SRO's do not have control over jobs or economic
resources that are easily translated into political influence. SRO's are
not a large enough group to be courted for their votes; nor are they
sufficiently organized to pressure officials into responding to their need
for better housing.
Statistically invisible, putatively deviant, and truly powerless, SRO's
need new efforts on their behalf. Recently, several serious attacks have
been launched at the housing problems of single persons with low in-
comes. Legal aid lawyers have helped SRO's obtain a temporary injunc-
tion to prevent the demolition of low-income hotels in a San Francisco
urban renewal project.60 One housing sponsor in New Haven, Connecti-
cut, is formulating a new building design suitable for low-income single
persons. 7 Public officials are trying to rehabilitate residential hotels in
with other occupants of one-room tenancies like efficiency or studio apartments. Report,
The Census-What's Wrong With It, What Can Be Done, 5 TRANSACTION 49, 55-6 (1968).
Although reliable national data on recent SRO trends is virtually non-existent, there
have been numerous case studies on SRO's in particular cities. See generally Skid Row, 28
JOURNAL OF HousING (June 1966).
A large number of case studies have been done in New York City. Bahr, Drinking, In-
teraction, and Identification: Note on Socialization into Skid Row, 8 JOURNAL OF HEALTH
AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 272 (1967); Bahr, Worklife Mobility Among Bowery Men, 49 SOUTH-
WESTERN SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY 128 (1968); Bahr and Langfur, Social Attachment and
Drinking in Skid Row Life Histories, 14 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 464 (1967); Bahr and Caplow,
Homelessness, Affiliation, and Occupational Mobility, 47 SOCIAL FORCES 28 (1968); Shapiro,
Single-Room Occupancy: Community of the Alone, 11 SOCIAL WoRK 24 (1966).
Other studies on SRO's have been done in Chicago, R. Vanderkooi, Relocation of West
Madison Skid Row Residents: A Study of the Problem with Recommendations (Prepared
May 1, 1967 for the Chicago Department of Urban Renewal) [hereinafter cited as Vander-
kooi]; in Sacramento, California, Bauer & McEntire, Relocation Study: Single Male Popu-
lation (Redevelopment Agency of the City of Sacramento, 1953); in Philadelphia, L.
Blumberg et al., The Men on Skid Row (Temple University, School of Medicine, 1960);
and in Minneapolis, Minnesota, Caplow, Lovald and Wallace. A General Report on the
Problem of Relocation of the Population of the Lower Loop Redevelopment Area (Min-
neapolis Housing and Redevelopment Authority, 1958).
Demographic estimates for any one city, however, may vary sharply from source to
source. For example, in 1950 Bogue estimated 11,400 SRO's in New York City, and said
the number of SRO's was declining. BoGuE, supra note 1, at 6, 9. Some years later esti-
mates have run from 50,000, NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF BUILDINGS, STATISTICAL RE-
PORT (1964); to 70,000, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1968, at 1, col. 2-8, 4; to 98,000, Levy, Needed:
A New Kind of Single-Room Occupancy Housing, 25 JOURNAL OF HOUSING 573 (1968).
5. S. WALLACE, SKID Row AS A WAY OF LIFE, chs. 9 and 11 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
WALLACE].
6. TOOR v. HUD, Civil Action No. C-69 324 SAW (N.D. Cal. April 29, 1970). Six of the
seven plaintiffs representing the class action are residents of low-income hotels.
7. The Student Community Housing Corporation (SCHC) of New Haven, Connecticut,
has been working on relocating the SRO's of the city's Strand Hotel, i hich is slated for
demolition in the near future. The SRO's of the Strand would like to stay together, but
the renewal authority has already torn down all other low-income hotels in the city. So
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New York and Seattle.8 Most importantly, in the post-election session of
1970, Congress passed two laws, the Uniform Relocation Act 9 and the
Moorhead Bill,' ° which will help SRO's cope with the effect of urban
renewal and provide some federal subsidies to construct low-income
hotels.
Although these developments are hopeful, they are not adequate
responses to the twin governmental policies of containment and
clearance. This Note will first describe important characteristics of
SRO's and their conflict with central city governments. Second, it will
discuss the past federal involvement in the municipal policy of clearance
and the impact of the Uniform Relocation Act on SRO's in local
renewal areas. Third, it will evaluate the federal subsidies that were
available to build low-income hotels and the changes brought about
by the Moorhead Bill. Finally, this Note will examine the inadequacies
of the Uniform Relocation Act and Moorhead Bill and suggest measures
which would provide a more effective response to the shelter needs of
SRO's.
I. SRO's and Local Governments
A. Some Characteristics of the SRO Population
SRO's are a unique class within American society. They are pre-
dominantly males."' The hotels in which they live are often located
near the central business district 12 because that area contains the main
SCHC, with the cooperation of local officials, has acquired a building near the central
business district for SRO use.
In order to plan effectively for the new building, SCHC did intensive surveys on the
social, economic, and physical needs of the Strand Hotel residents. SCHC also considered
the unique characteristics of the Strand Hotel-the political battles between hotel resi-
dents and the renewal authority as well as the historical development of a tightly knit
hotel community. [Research on the Strand Hotel project will hereinafter be cited as
SCHC Papers.]
8. New York City recently established the Office of Problem Housing in its Housing
and Development Administration to deal with the shelter needs of SRO's and other dis-
advantaged groups. This office has recently begun to rehabilitate several low-income ho-
tels. E. Baer and C. Arner, New Housing for Furnished Room Inhabitants, April 22, 1970
(mimeo report, on file with New York City Housing and Development Administration).
In Seattle, a pilot program has been started at the Frye Hotel. After rehabilitation, the
hotel was employed both to house SRO's and to serve as a physical base for social action
programs. Abie Label and Associates, The Seattle Plan (Seattle, Washington, 1970).
9. Pub. Law No. 91-1784, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). For the full text of the bill, see
CoNG. Rxc., 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at H11992-12007 (Dec. 17, 1970).
10. The Moorhead Bill was passed as part of the Housing and Urban Development
Act of 1970, Pub. Law No. 91-1656, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). For the full text of the
bill, see CONG. REc., 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at S20459-20463 (Dec. 17, 1970).
11. SRO's are now mainly a male phenomenon for the simple reason that men cannot
have children and form families. However, before World War II, there were some females
found in SRO communities. WALLACE, supra note 5, at 23.
12. BoGuE, supra note 1, at 19-45. Locational preferences for housing often reflect the
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sources of SRO revenue-low-skilled factories, service jobs, welfare
agencies, and charities. 13 SRO's are often stereotyped as "drunks," but,
in fact, only a relatively small proportion are alcoholics. 14 According to
two major studies on SRO's, many are willing to enter some form of
human rehabilitation program.' 5 In the lobbies of residential hotels and
on the streets of downtown, SRO's form a community of singles.
While SRO's historically were migrants from rural areas to the city,
they are now often products of urban ghettos.'6 Some are elderly, some
are physically disabled, and an increasing number are non-white.' 7 The
average SRO' 8 comes from a poor family. Since he usually has little
education, he is at the bottom of the employment ladder. Only one out
of three SRO's holds a regular job; the others depend on the demand
for casual labor. The average SRO has a monthly income around $150,
of which he pays out $25-$50 per month in rent.
There are three distinct explanations why SRO's live in residen-
tial hotels. The first theory argues that single, poorly educated men
are driven to SRO status by economic circumstances. 19 It focuses on the
failure of the country's school systems and training programs to integrate
SRO's into the labor force, rather than on individual failures. A corol-
lary to this theory emphasizes the economics of the housing market. In
cities with low-vacancy rates, single men working in low paying jobs
find apartment rents unreasonably high. Pensioners or welfare recipients
may be given so little money that they are unable to find a decent
apartment.20
social needs of organized communities. Like SRO's, members of the urban working class,
urban villagers, choose to live near the downtown districts. In such a location, working
men are often within walking distance of their factories, or at least dose by mass transit
stops that serve outlying areas. Also, urban villagers in the skilled trades can set up small
shops which serve downtown businesses and employees. H. GANS, URBAN VILLAGERS 19-24
(1966).
13. WALLACE, supra note 5, at chs. 4 and 6.
14. Serious alcoholics form only 20-30 per cent of the SRO population. SKID Row, su-
pra note 4, at 3. A large proportion of this alcoholic sub-group drink as a means to es-
cape the reality of their other social problems. BOGUE, supra note 1, at 288.
15. Bogue states that 74.8% of SRO's were interested in entering free job training
programs. BOGUE, supra note 1, at 193. Vanderkooi found that 75% of those interviewed
wanted some type of rehabilitation program. Vanderkooi, supra note 4, at 25.
16. BOGUE, supra note 1, at 243-4.
17. Id. at 106-7; Vanderkooi, supra note 4, at 16.
18. The statistics on the average SRO are taken from BOGUE, supra note 1, at 10-15,
and Vanderkooi, supra note 4, at 13-18.
19. Bogue favors this explanation. He states, "Individual men gravitate to Skid Row
far more frequently because of irregular employment, unemployment, and low income,
than because of alcoholism." BOGUE, supra note 1, at 404.
20. In San Francisco, for example, workingmen have been forced to live in residential
hotels because the vacancy rate in 1969 for one-room studio apartments renting at under
$100 per month was between zero and .3% and the rate for one-bedroom units in the
same price category was zero. San Francisco Department of City Planning, Survey of
Housing Table 3 (Housing Report 3, Dec., 1969).
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A second explanation states that persons are forced into SRO status
because social institutions do not adequately respond to the needs of
the disadvantaged.21 An SRO may not be so mentally or physically ill
as to qualify for admission to state medical institutions, but still be so
infirm that he cannot find shelter other than in a low-income hotel.
In sharp contrast to the first two explanations, the third suggests that
men live in residential hotels because they like this style of living.22 In
any society there are groups who refuse to accept the prevalent social
norms; they form a subculture of their own,23 which has a well-
defined set of social mores. Like the working class families studied by
Gans,24 SRO's remain in their subculture because the benefits of per-
sonal tolerance outweigh the costs of isolation from the larger com-
munity.
Thus, SRO's live in residential hotels rather than apartments because
they offer cheaper rentals, because SRO's are too infirm to find any
better place to live, or because SRO's prefer the hotel style of life.25 All
low-income hotels provide small rooms with common bathroom facili-
ties; they also usually supply large lobbies and services like room-clean-
In many cities, welfare departments encourage recipients to live in residential hotels as
a way of conserving funds. BOG E, supra note 1, at 54-5. Moreover, in some places, the
structure of welfare payments acts as an incentive to become a SRO. For example, the
New York City Department of Welfare pays an average of $82.45 for a furnished room
but only $65.75 for an unfurnished unit. N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1968, at 1, col. 1-2.
21. Shapiro takes this view. Shapiro, supra note 4. She says, "Unattached single indi-
viduals constitute a group of the poor population characterized by marked social and
psychological maladaptation and chronic physical disease; they are neither sick or deviant
enough to be institutionalized nor well enough to use health, social and welfare services
effectively." Id. at 24.
22. WALLACE, supra note 5, at 128.
23. SRO's are disaffiliated from the larger society. They have fewer ties with social
organizations than lower-class men from family neighborhoods. Bahr and Caplow, supra
note 4. The more SRO's interact with other single men, the less they have social relations
with persons outside of SRO areas. Bahr, Drinking, Interaction, and Identification: Note
on Socialization into Skid Row, 8 JOURNAL OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 272, 284
(1967).
Older men often choose to live in residential hotels for a society of their peers. Bogue,
supra note 4, at 50. Workingmen in residential hotels sometimes form informal corpora-
tions that serve as insurance agencies to its members. Id. at 57. The same form of insur-
ance has been found among panhandlers. WALLACE, supra note 5, at 157-8. The bottle
gangs, which pool their resources to obtain drink at the lowest per unit prices, have been
noted for their cooperative features. Id. "Hippies" in the SRO category have their own
communal style of living. Vanderkooi, Changing Ecological Patterns of Homeless Men,
Spring 1970 (paper presented to Illinois Sociological Society).
24. H. GANS, supra note 12, at chs. 2 and 11.
25. Subcultures often have unique housing preferences in line with their social priori-
ties. The urban villagers, for example, preferred to live cheaply in old two-family houses
although many could afford better homes of their own. This housing arrangement served
two functions simultaneously: more money for durable consumer goods, and an oppor-
tunity to share a house with members of their extended families. H. GANS, supra note 12,
at 12-16, 182-7. For a discussion of the social functions served by particular types of dwell-
ings, see Rainwater, Fear and the House-as-Haven in the Lower Class, 32 J. AM. INST.
PLANNERS 23-31 (1966).
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ing. As single persons, SRO's require places to congregate and socialize;
they often need someone to make their beds and wash their clothes.
While sharing certain general characteristics, low-income residential
hotels are of two distinct types. One type 26 contains elderly pensioners,
those who desire hotel residency, and single working men who cannot
find cheap, decent housing in the local apartment market. The rooms
are generally sanitary and the common places are well-maintained. This
type usually develops a long-term clientele who form a coherent com-
munity. The other type of hotel2 7 attracts the unemployed, the alcoholic,
the physically handicapped, and the mentally ill. The rooms may be
small cubicles roofed with chicken wire to protect against thieves; the
hallways may be in a dilapidated condition. This type has a relatively
transient clientele who generally have little interaction.
B. The Municipal Response
The needs of SRO's, as physically expressed in both types of resi-
dential hotels, directly conflict with the economic interests of city
governments. Municipalities derive most of their revenues from prop-
erty taxes, which have traditionally been supported by industrial hold-
ings and middle-class homes. After World War II, firms left the central
city because of increasing traffic congestion, land costs, and property
taxes.2 8 Homeowners followed firms for a variety of reasons-racial
prejudice, deteriorating schools, or the social status of a suburban
address.29 At the same time, the influx of rural poor, together with the
population boom in the urban ghettos, greatly increased local expendi-
tures on social services. 0
26. The Strand Hotel in New Haven, studied by SCHC, is a good example.
27. For detailed description and photographs of this second type, see BoGuE, supra
note 1, at 79-90.
28. For the last two decades, employment in suburban manufacturing, wholesaling,
retailing, and service industries has been increasing at an annual rate of over 10%, while
central city employment in these four categories has declined or stayed the same. John
Kain, The Distribution and Movement of Jobs and Industry, in METROPOLITAN ENIGMA(J. Wilson ed. 1967).
For discussion of the movement of jobs and industry within metropolitan areas, see
e.g., R. VERNON, THE CHANGING ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS OF THE CENTRAL CITY (1959); D.
CREAMER, CHANGING LOCATION OF MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT (1963).
29. Out of the twenty-two largest central cities in America, only nine showed any rise
in the white population from 1950 to 1960; every one of these cities increased its number
of Negro inhabitants, some by over 100%. INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS SUBCO nITTE1
OF THE SENATE CorMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, METROPOLITAN AMERICA: CHAL-
LENGE TO FEDERALISM 18 (1966).
For a discussion of the extent, causes, and implications of suburban growth, see C.
Tunnard, America's Super-Cities, 217 HARPER'S MAGAZINE 59 (1958); H. Eldredge, People:
Urbanization and City Growth in 1 TAMING MEGALOPOLIS 93 (H. ELDREDGE ed. 1967); J.
GOTTMAN, MEGALOPOLIS (1961); E. and G. Grier, Equality and Beyond: Housing Segrega-
tion in the Great Society, 95 DAEDAIus 77 (1966).
30. In the period from 1957 to 1965, per capita expenditures of central cities on pub-
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As industry moved out, even able-bodied SRO's were trans-
formed from an important source of unskilled labor to a public welfare
burden.31 Many of the firms remaining in the central city introduced
automated processes which require high-skill workers. As homeowners
left, city officials became more conscious of the low property taxes paid
by residential hotels relative to their central locations.32
Caught between increasing costs and decreasing revenues, munici-
palities chose to ignore the serious problems of SRO's, instead of re-
habilitating substandard buildings, retraining able-bodied men, and
caring for the physically or mentally il.33 No efforts were made to stop
the economic exploitation of SRO's regularly practiced by employment
agencies, employers, and restaurants. 34 Local government supplied
hotels with the minimum protection by police, who often took advan-
tage of owners and residents.35
With the advent of urban renewal, local governments grasped the
opportunity to tear down low-paying hotels and replace them with civic
lic services rose by 45.9%. D. Netzer, Financing Urban Government, in Tim Mrrnopou-
TAN ENIGMA 58 (J. Wilson ed. 1967).
For a discussion of the implications of urban economic and demographic trends for
city finances, see C. Tilly, Race and Migration to the American City in Tim M r 0Tor-
TAN ENIG.MA 124 (J. Wilson ed., 1967); D. Moynihan, Poverty in Cities in TiE ,M1rnrOU-
TAN ENIGMA 300 (J. WILSON ed., 1967); and R. Vernon, The Economics and Finances of
The Large Metropolis, 90 DAEDALUS 51 (1961).
31. Slightly less than one-half of all SRO's receive some form of public assistance.
BOGUE, supra note 1, at 103, and Vanderkooi, supra note 4, at 13.
82. A study of SRO areas in New York City over the last century found that land
values had stayed the same in these places, while the price of property in the rest of
Manhattan had multiplied by five times. Sigal, The Unchanging Area in Transition, 43
LAN EcoNoMics 284, 287 (1967).
33. Bogue says, "Rather than create a coherent program of help and rehabilitation,
society temporizes by quarantining the men in a particular section .... " BocuE, supra
note 1, at 406.
While welfare and charitable organizations sometimes offer food, clothing, and health
care, SRO's resent these institutions because of their paternalistic attitudes. Wallace de-
scribes the SRO's relation to such agencies as an exercise in role playing, with the SRO
meeting the minimum behavioral standard to obtain what is being handed ouL WALLACE,
supra note 5, at ch. 4.
Containment as a municipal policy is legally suspect. Cities should implement their
own ordinances-on sanitary food, police protection and usury-for the benefit of SRO's
as well as other local citizens. Cities should enforce local housing codes in low-income
hotels together with fair rent ordinances or other measures to prevent landlord retalia-
tion against SRO's. For a discussion of differential enforcement of cit) ordinances, sec
Ratner, Inter-Neighborhood Denials of Equal Protection in the Provision of Municipal
Services, 4 HARV. Crw. RIGH-s-Cxv. LIB. L. Rzv. 1 (1968).
34. Employment agencies usually take one-third or more of SRO wages. Employers
often do not pay them the minimum wage or give them Social Security credits for jobs
clearly eligible. Restaurants and taverns loan money to SRO's at usurious rals-interest
of 50% over a three-day period is common. Eating and drinking places sometines serve
SRO's food that violates public health standards. BonUE, supra note 1, at at -19994.
35. Some policemen receive "protection money" from both SRO's and hotel owners.
Officers have been known to beat SRO's brutally or arrest them spuriously for loos-ely de-
fined crimes like vagrancy. Booue, supra note 1, at 492-3 and 1%ALLA. CE, supra note 5. at
ch. 7.
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centers and shopping malls attractive to wealthy homeowners8 0 Lack of
replacement housing acted to drive SRO's out of town. Other measures
were also taken to exclude SRO's. Cities passed ordinances requiring
the deconversion of SRO units formed previously by subdividing apart-
ments.3 Municipalities used zoning codes to outlaw units inhabited
by more than four persons unrelated by blood.88
II. The Federal Role in Clearance
The federal government has played a central role in enabling munic-
ipalities to carry out programs of SRO clearance. Through subsidization
of urban renewal, it helps finance the planning of SRO removal, the
demolition of residential hotels, and the development of parcels pre-
viously occupied by SRO buildings.39
In addition to simply supplying financing, federal renewal law has
weighted the relocation process against SRO's after they were forced out
of their residences; and, under current doctrines, effective remedies for
SRO's are not available in the courts. While the Uniform Relocation
Act has increased the monetary benefits for displaced SRO's, it avoids
the most crucial problem-adequate relocation housing.
A. SRO's and the Relocation Process
The relocation process has been weighted against SRO's at two stages.
Prior to the Uniform Relocation Act, SRO's were denied many mone-
tary benefits after displacement. Even now, SRO's are less able to find
suitable relocation housing either in the existing rental market or in
new units.
86. As examples, in New Haven, Conn., a city known for its "progressive" renewal
program, the city tore down all but one of the original dozen or so residential hotels; the
last is slated for demolition. No new facilities have been built. SCHC Papers, supra note
7. In Stockton, California, a nine-block area of SRO housing was replaced by a cominer.
cial district and convention hall. Skid Row, supra note 4, at 6. In Oklahoma City, Okla-
homa, one site in a renewal area, which had housed 267 SRO's, was cleared for the con-
struction of a theater. Levy, supra note 4, at 575.
SRO's are only one of many powerless groups who have been sacrificed in the interest
of property owners. For a discussion of distribution of urban renewal's costs and benec
fits, see, e.g., W. VON ECKARDT, BULLDOZERS AND BuREAucRATs: CrEs AND U AN RENEWAL
(1963); URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY CT. Wilson ed. 1960).
87. In New York City, the deconversion would ultimately force S0,000 to 70,000 SRO's
to find new places to live. Apartments with one bathroom for more than six tenants are
already unlawful, while deconversion of all subdivided apartments is required by July 14,
1977. N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1968, at 1, col. 2.
38. A good example is Amendment to § 1. Definitions of the Code of Ordinances of
the City of New Haven (Family), NEw HAVEN ZONING CODE 533 (Operative July 28, 19069).
39. The federal government contributes two-thirds of the cost of local renewal projects,
42 U.S.C.A. § 1453(a)(2).
402
Vol. 80: 395, 1970
No Room for Singles
Before this year, unless SRO's were disabled or elderly, they could
not receive the Additional Relocation Payment (ARP) of up to $500
per year for two years after displacement.4 0 If SRO's do not have the
same mailing address for ninety consecutive days before displacement,
they still are ineligible for any relocation benefits.41 This provision is
a serious burden on many SRO's who either have no mailing address
or who switch hotels periodically. Even if SRO's meet the ninety day
requirement, those without furniture are given only a flat sum of five
dollars for moving expenses.4
Although displaced SRO's are by law required to be given a decent,
sanitary unit,4 3 in practice there is often no appropriate standard
housing in the existing market. In finding SRO's a place to live, HUD
does not have to consider unique living styles or communal organiza-
tions. 4 While SRO's may want to continue living in hotels, existing
SRO buildings are usually overcrowded or themselves slated for demoli-
tion. SRO's cannot afford the rent of most standard apartments; and
apartment owners do not like to accept SRO's because of their alleged
social deviancy.45
In order for a new low-income hotel to be built on cleared land,
HUD demands a costly and time-consuming survey on the market
for transient housing 40 More importantly, the 1969 Weicker Amend-
ment, designed to require municipal construction of sufficient relocation
housing, does not apply to SRO's.47 This amendment requires that each
family unit demolished in urban renewal be replaced by a new one
within the jurisdictional area of the renewal authority. Replacement of
the SRO units demolished is not required.
40. 42 U.SC.A. § 1465(c)(2).
41. For a discussion of the 90-day limitation, see Skid Row, 23 Journal of Housing 3-4
(June 1965).
42. 24 C.F.R. 3.105(b)(2)i (1970).
43. 42 U.S.CA.. § 1455(c)(1).
44. Id. The section says only that the relocation area, as compared to the original
neighborhood, must not be "generally less desirable in regard to public utilities and pub-
lic and commercial facilities .. .
45. For example, in a Minneapolis renewal project, 44% of SRO's before relocation
paid less than $20 per month for rent, while after relocation only 2A% spent less than
$20 a month on housing. Vanderkooi, supra note 4, at 6. For a discussion of the discrim-
inatory rental market faced by displaced single persons in Pittsburgh, see Hearings on
Housing and Urban Development Legislation-1970 Before the Subcomm. on Housing of
the House Comm. on Banking and Currerncy, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 3..2 (1970) (state-
ment of J. David Barkley).
46. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1456(g). This section was inserted at the request of the American
Hotel Association. The request can be found in Hearings on S. 57, 65, 193, 19f, 195, 266,
271, 272, 336, 543, 612, 655 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency. 86th
Cong., Ist Sess., at 754-5 (1959); and Hearings on H.R. 2357, 3319, 130, and H.j. Res. 89
Before the Subcomm. on Housing of the House Comm. on Banhing and Currency, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess., at 705-06 (1959).
47. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1455(h).
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B. Judicial Barriers to Standard Housing for SRO's
While SRO's have been clearly harmed, both in terms of benefits
and relocation housing, by the federal displacement process, judicial
review has been concerned primarily with relocation housing.48 For
years, SRO's and owners of residential hotels could not obtain effec-
tive judicial redress for their injuries because of a restrictive inter-
pretation of standing requirements.49 Since the criteria for standing
have been liberalized,5" both groups are now afforded the opportunity
to have their grievances heard on the merits. But since there is no
constitutional right to a decent place to live, 1 SRO's are unable to
construct legal arguments on which they could actually win their cases.
While SRO's could plead specific violations of the renewal law, local
agency violation of the right to live in a city, or federal legislative
exclusions not reasonably related to statutory purpose, each line of
48. Before the Uniform Relocation Act, SRO's had no substantial monetary bene-
fits to protect. Now they should be able to obtain the money payments available under
the Act. See p. 412 infra.
49. Hotel owners were denied standing to challenge the construction of a competitor
in a renewal project. Taft Hotel Corp. v. HHFA, 262 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1958), afl'g 162
F. Supp. 538 (D. Conn. 1958). Community groups were denied standing to challenge re-
location plans in Green Street Association v. Daley, 373 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. den'd,
387 U.S. 932 (1967); and Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency of the City of Oakland, 317
F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. den'd, 375 U.S. 915 (1963). See Note, Judicial Review of
Displacee Relocation in Urban Renewal, 77 YAM L.J. 966 (1968).
50. Association of Data Processing Service Organization, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). The Supreme Court said that standing would
be granted if a person had in fact been injured or threatened with irreparable harm, and
was in the zone of interest of the relevant statute or constitutional mandate. The Injury
test derives from the Article III requirement of adverseness; the zone of interest criterion
comes from the "aggrieved person" standard of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C.A. § 702. The Supreme Court made clear that the concept of injury should not be
limited to economic harm. Injury may reflect aesthetic, conservational, recreational or
spiritual values, as well as economic harm. 397 U.S. at 154. The Supreme Court also said
the zone of interest should be construed broadly. 397 U.S. at 154.
Lower courts had earlier allowed standing to displaced persons on other grounds. See
Norwalk Core v. Norwalk Redevelopment Authority, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968); Western
Addition Community Organization v. Weaver, 294 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Cal. 1968), Powel.
ton Civic Homeowners Association v. HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968), Sec also
Tondro, Urban Renewal Relocation: Problems in Enforcement of Conditions on Federal
Grants to Local Agencies, 117 U. PA. L. Rav. 183 (1968).
Thus, both SRO's and hotel owners should have their cases heard on the merits, When
low-income hotels are torn down, SRO's may be injured by the psychological loss of se-
curity, the physical hardship of finding a new place, and the financial burden of higher
rents; and the federal relocation statute was designed to help those, like displaced SRO's,
forced out by renewal projects. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1455. Owners of low-income hotels may be
economically harmed because they are put out of business; and the housing survey le-
quired by the renewal act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1456(g), was aimed at insuring a local market
for transient housing which would not be harmful to existing hotels. Moreover, In Asso.
ciation of Data Processing Service Organization, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), the
Court specifically approved standing for plaintiffs claiming financial harm through In-
creased economic competition.
51. See Michelman, Advent of a Right to Housing: A Current Appraisal, 5 HARv. CiV.
RIGHTS-Civ. LIB. L. REv. 207 (1969).
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attack on SRO problems is fraught with difficult practical or theoretical
problems.
(1) Agency Violation of Relocation Provisions
As in current litigation challenging proposed demolition of low in-
come hotels in San Francisco, SRO's have usually argued that HUD
should not approve the local renewal agency's plans because they were
formulated without the procedural safeguards and assurances of ade-
quate relocation housing required by statute.5 2
Arguments based on alleged violations of renewal statutes are very
difficult to prove. If SRO's plead legislative violations, then they have
to demonstrate statistically that there are not enough vacancies in the
existing housing market to cope with the displacement of large numbers
of single men. In most cases, uneducated SRO's do not have lawyers with
the expertise needed to overcome the statistical barrage of local market
surveys generated by the agency's full-time, professional staff.c Even
when SRO's can obtain technical aid, the factual issues are so com-
plicated that the trial is extremely long. For example, in the San
Francisco case the SRO's were in court almost a year until the con-
troversy was temporarily settled.5 4 Finally, to win a case alleging legisla-
52. Complaint of TOOR (Declaratory and Injunctive Relief), TOOR v. HUD, Civil
Action No. C-69 324 SAW (N.D. Cal. 1970).
53. In the San Francisco case, the SRO's were fortunate to obtain the assistance of
city planning experts from a nearby university. See Community Design Center at the
University of California Extension, Housing Proposal for the Yerba Buena Redevelop-
ment Project June, 1970 (prepared for Toot).
54. TOOR v. HUD, Civil Action No. C-69 324 SAW (N.D. Cal. 1970). In the spring of
this year, Judge Weigel handed down a preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiff
SRO's because he found that the federal government should not have approved the re-
newal plan for the Yerba Buena Center. Judge Weigel said that the San Francisco Rede-
vlopment Agency had not provided adequate assurances of relocation housing, and had
not consulted minority groups, as required by federal statutes. TOOR v. HUD, Civil Ac-
tion No. C-69 324 SAW, Findings and Conlusions for Preliminar,, Injunction; Orders on
Motions for Dismissal and Partial Summary Judgment dated April 29, 1970, The prelim-
nary injunction restrains the Agency from in any way attemptmng to move SRO's out of
the renewal area or demolish any residential structures within the area. The court order
enjoins HUD from honoring requisitions from the local agency for financing of the
Yerba Buena Redevelopment project. TOOR v. HUD, Civil Action No. C-69 324 SAW.
Preliminary Injunction, April 29, 1970.
On May 25, 1970. Edmund G. Brown, former governor of California, was appointed as
master to aid the court in arriving at a just resolution of the conflict around the Yerba
Buena project. After four lengthy conferences with counsel and other spokesnen for the
parties, Brown found that a minimum of 2,000 units of new low-rent housing beyond
current plans would be desirable to house the 1,50D people in the Yerba Buena area and
others being displaced currently by renewal projects in the Western Addition section of
San Francisco. He therefore recommended that the agency submit to the court by Sep-
tember 15, 1970, a list of sites of its own choosing within the city on which 2,000 units
of low-income housing could be built. Findings, Recommendations, and Order of Special
Master, June 18, 197G. The Master's report was accepted by Judge Weigel. Order Re:
Special Master's Report, Aug. 3, 1970. But the development agency rejected the Master's
report because they felt that the existing housing supply could absorb all displacees from
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tive violations, SRO's have the burden of persuading a court that the
agency abused its discretion. Courts have been deferential to the expert
judgments made by city planning departments; and HUD's prior
approval of a local agency's plans currently carries great weight with
the judiciary.55
(2) Equal Protection: The Right to Live in a City
Relying on similar holdings in Norwalk Core v. Norwalk Redevelop.
ment56 and Arrington v. City of Fairfield,5 7 SRO's could also argue that
renewal which forced a particular class out of a city violated the Equal
Protection Clause.58 Their success would depend on the standard of
review applied by the Court.
the Yerba Buena area. Instead, a new relocation plan for Yerba Buena was submitted by
the local redevelopment agency to HUD. The major difference in the new plan Is the
pranting of special preference to displacees from this project for entry into public hons,
ing, Letter from Amanda Fisher, co-counsel for TOOR, to Robert Pozen, Sept. 14, 1970,
Recently Judge Weigel was able to reach a compromise settlement with counsel from
both sides. This compromise, however, was soundly rejected by the plaintiff SRO's, So
Judge Weigel has dissolved the injunction against the renewal authority and issued a
court order which directs the authority to construct 1,500 units of low-income housing
within the next three years. The renewal authority is not allowed to tear down five exist-
ing residential hotels with a total of about 500 rooms until it carries out the court's or-
der. Memorandum Concerning the Court's Order of November 9, 1970; and telephone
interview with Amanda Fisher, co-counsel for plaintiffs, Nov. 12, 1970.
55. While the Uniform Relocation Act will place such a case under the Administrative
Procedure Act, there will be no change in the standard of proof. See note 99 infra.
56. 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968). In Norwalk, Connecticut, the local urban renewal agency
drew up plans to demolish low-income units, including SRO buildings, withoult providing
for adequate replacements. There were no vacancies for low-income persons in thre rest of
the city, and the private housing market discriminated against minority groups. Once dis.
placed, these groups would have in effect been forced to leave the city.
The Norwalk court held that renewal officials would be acting illegally If they intended
that the project, together with the well-known discrimination in the local housing mar-
ket, act to exclude minority groups from the dty. The court went further and said that the
plan would be invalid even if the excluson of minority groups was unintended, relying
on Judge J. Skelley Wright's opinion in Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C.),
affirmed sub. nom. Smuck v. Hansen, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
57. 414 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1969) (Motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment).
In Arrington, the federal government refused to underwrite a proposed urban renewal
project because the plans did not meet HUD relocation standards. A private realty cont.
pany then decided to clear land and build a motel in what was to be the renewal area,
To assist this project, the city administration agreed only to install storm sewers and cover
a tar ditch. Community groups as plaintiffs alleged that motel construction would (lis-
place many low-income families, predominantly blacks, who would not be able to find
new places to live in Fairfield because of rampant discrimination in the private housing
market. Since there was no involvement with the federal renewal program, the court had
to base its opinion solely on the equal protection clause. In holding for the community
group, the court said that a city cannot participate in a project which it knows will force
a class of persons outside of municipal limits, even though the discrimination is accoin-
plished by private means.
58. Residential hotels are located in one or two distinct areas in most cities, generally
marginal neighborhoods close to downtown and invariably first priorities for urban
renewal. See pp. 397-98 supra. When these areas are levelled by renewal projects, there
are no other residential hotels. SRO's are too poor to afford the rents of traditional
urban apartments; and they are subject to discrimination in the private rental market
of the city which is oriented toward housing families. In effect, renewal may drive SRO's
out of town.
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Under standard Equal Protection doctrine, government classifications
are invalid only if they are not rationally related to a valid public pur-
pose. 9 SRO's would first have to show statistically that they were ex-
cluded from relocation opportunities in the housing market of the
particular city. Then they would have to surmount the judicial pre-
sumption that the policy which resulted in SRO exclusion is rationally
related to some valid public purpose. Since the needs of SRO's often
conflict with the economic interests of municipalities, it would be al-
most impossible for SRO's to demonstrate that their exclusion was not
rationally related to a permissible goal.00
To win an Equal Protection argument, SRO's would have to
convince the court to apply the compelling state interest standard, a
more rigorous alternative to the traditional rational relation standard,
in reviewing the validity of the municipality's action. Under this
standard, the city would have to demonstrate a compelling interest in
the clearance of SRO housing.0 1 Outside the area of military security,
the state has historically almost never been able to meet this burden.Ce
The compelling state interest standard is imposed under two types of
conditions. First, the standard is used if a classification is "suspect--if
it involves differential treatment of certain disadvantaged minorities.0
Second, the standard is applied when a classificatory scheme restrains
the exercise of a citizen's fundamental rights.0 4 The exclusion of SRO's
from a city through renewal may arguably trigger review in either way.
As a very disadvantaged minority, 5 SRO's might qualify as a suspect
category, as did the plaintiffs in Norwalk and Arrington. The difficulty
59. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61,78 (1911). See generally Note,
Developments in the Law: Equal Protection, 82 Hv. L. REv. 1065, 1076-S7 (1966) [here-
inafter cited as Developments].
60. Cf. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970): "We need not explore all
the reasons that the State advances in justification of the regulation. It is enough that
a solid foundation for the regulation can be found in the State's legitimate interest in
encouraging employment and in avoiding discrimination between welfare families and
the families of the working poor."
61. Developments, supra note 59, at 1087-1132.
62. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
63. The clearest example of a suspect category is blacks, Developments, supra note 59,
at 1087-1104, although the courts have extended the suspect label to certain subgroups of
the poor. See Harper v. Virginia Ed. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Douglas %. Cali-
fornia, 372 US. 353 (1963); and Note, Discrimination Against the Poor and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 81 HARv. L. Rnv. 435 (1967).
64. For example, in recent cases on welfare residency requirements, the Court made
dear that the State had to show a compelling interest in such requirements because they
restrained the fundamental right to travel. Shapiro v. Thompson, S94 U.S. 618 (199).
65. SRO's are in many ways as deprived a minority as blacks. In terms of quality of
housing, SRO's live in as substandard conditions as blacks. See note I supra. In relation to
income, SRO's earn less money than non-whites on the average. In regard to childhood
backgrounds, SRO's come from as disadvantaged families as most blacks. BocuE, supra
note 1, at 14-15.
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with this approach, however, is that in both Norwalk and Arrington the
class excluded was blacks, and in moving from race as a suspect category
to some sub-group of the poor like SRO's, serious problems arise."0
While the Court may be seen as protecting certain sub-groups of the
poor through suspect category analysis in cases involving state voting
and criminal appeals by indigents,67 the Court has not begun to suggest
guidelines making clear which sub-groups of the poor are to be accorded
special judicial treatment in other settings. The cases have not demar-
cated the attributes of the particular sub-groups themselves which could
be applied as limiting criteria.68 Rather, the main difference between
the sub-groups of the poor afforded special judicial treatment is the im-
portance of the right denied--criminal appeals and voting-a differenti-
ation which seems to move away from suspect classification status toward
the concept of fundamental rights.
SRO's could also attempt to trigger the compelling state interest stan-
dard of review by convincing the Court that their fundamental rights
to travel were at stake. In the welfare residency cases, the Court made
clear that the right to travel included the right to reside or migrate to the
state of one's choice.69 SRO's could argue that if residential hotels were
torn down without the provision of replacements, SRO's living in the
city would in effect be driven out, and SRO's in other areas would be
strongly deterred from moving to the city.
The problem with this argument is that any unfavorable difference
between municipalities, in residency requirements for services or in ac-
tual level of services, is in a sense a deterrence to inhabitation or migra-
tion.70 Since the Court is not going to make all state laws identical,
66. It would seem that even the nature of the analysis shifts when poverty is to be
considered suspect. When one considers more traditional categories, like race, allenage,
or illegitimacy, the concern is with the kind of category. When one considers a subgroup
of the poor, the focus must shift to one of degree. The question becomes whether tiffs
sub-group of the poor is more or less deprived than other subgroups--a very difficult
question if lines are to be drawn rationally by a court.
67. For a full explication of this interpretation of recent equal protection cases, see
Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83
HARv. L. REv. 7 (1969).
68. Yet proximity to the subsistence level of existence seems to be one characteristic of
sub-groups of the poor selected for special judicial treatment. Goldberg v. Kelly, 897 V.A.
254, 260-66 (1970). Many SRO's are living very close to the subsistence level. Another
criterion for distinguishing sub-groups of the poor might be judicial manageability.
SRO's are a very manageable group for the courts since they all share the same design
needs and most have incomes in the lowest strata of the poverty bracket.
69. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). The argument that the right to travel
is a fundamental interest has already been applied to the housing field. The First Circuit
has held that residency requirements for public housing violate the right of travel of
low-income persons who could not otherwise reside within the unit's boundaries. Cole v.
Newport Housing Authority, 39 U.S.L.W. 2320 (1st Cir. 1970).
70. Thus, if residency requirements for public housing infringe upon the fundamental
408
Vol. 80: 395, 1970
No Room for Singles
SRO's would be forced to show why the demolition of residential hotels
is particularly burdensome on the right to travel. SRO's could find sup-
port in the zoning cases holding that exclusion of low-income groups
by large lot requirements is illegal.71 But no court has said that exclu-
sions caused by urban renewal are illegal except if the excluded group
is a suspect category.72
If SRO's could not fit themselves neatly into either the suspect
category or fundamental interest branches of the compelling interest
standard, they could interpret recent decisions as applying a sub rosa
balancing test which afforded protection to a "quasi-suspect" class whose
interests in an important (what perhaps might be termed "quasi-funda-
mental") right outweighed the financial and administrative burdens
imposed by these rights on the state."
right to travel of low-income persons, Cole v. Newport Housing Authority, 39 U.S.L'W.
2320 (1st Cir. 1970), then the failure of a municipality to build public housing at all
similarly restrains the right to travel. Cf. Valtierra v. Housing Authority of City of
San Jose, 313 F. Supp. 1 (1970), prob. juris. noted, 398 U.S. 949 (1970).
71. See generally Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection,
and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. Rlv. 767, 782-5 (1969). For example, the Penns)lania
Supreme Court recently held that "a scheme of zoning that has an exclusionary purpose
or result is not acceptable in Pennsylvania." Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 268 A.2d
765, 766 (Pa. 1970).
72. See notes 56-57 supra.
73. The balancing approach is explored in depth in Michelman, supra note 67. It
merges the two traditional branches of the compelling interest standard. Its justification
is in the political impotence of deprived minorities who cannot achieve their goals through
the legislative process. See Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic So-
ciety-Judicial Activism or Restraint, 54 Coanr. L. R v. 1 (1968).The jurisprudential difficulties with defining "fundamental interests", parallel .thse for
defining "suspect cassification." The prototpe for a "fundamental interest" s voting.But after the prototype is passed, the Court must place the label °'fundaental" on
interests by an ad hoc balancing test, unless it develops a full.scale ranking sytem.See p. 410 infra. Similarly, the prototype of a "suspect classification" is blacks. 
After
that prototype is passed, the courts have no lear guide for applying 
the "suspect" label.
The difficulties with delineating fundamental interests and suspect 
dasiicatios ave
led at least three Supreme Court Justices to reject the two-track conceptual model of
the compelling interest standard. Justice Harlan appears to have 
opted for a single
test of rationality:
Except with respect to racial cassifications, to which unique historical 
considerations
apply, I believe the constitutional provisions assuring equal protection 
of the laws
impose a standard of rationality of classification, long aplied in 
de decisions of this
Court, that does not depend upon the nature of the classification 
or interest involved.
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 489 (1970) (Harlan, J. concurring) (citations omitted).On the other hand, Justice Marshall, in an opinion with which Justice rennan 
con-
curred, appears to have taken an explicit balancing test.
The Court never undertakes to inquire for such a justifications rather it avoids
the task by focusing upon the abstract dichotomy between two 
different approaches
to equal protection problems which have been utilized by this 
Court.
In my view, equal protection analysis of this case is not appreciably advanced by"the a priori definition of a "right," fundamental or otherwise. 
Ratler, conce tration
must be placed upon the character of the cassificaton in question, 
the relative u-
portance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the 
governmental benefits
which they do not receive, and the asserted state interests in support 
of the clasifica-
tion.397 U.S. at 519, 520-21 (arshall, J. dissenting) (citations omitted),
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Yet, if courts held that SRO's were a suspect category based on such a
sub rosa balancing approach, it would still not be clear how SRO's could
be distinguished from numerous other sub-groups of the poor also dis-
advantaged by governmental action involving important rights. To adopt
such a balancing approach for SRO's and other deprived minorities
without explicit legislative or constitutional guidance, the courts would
have to develop an elaborate ranking system for sub-groups of the poor,
types of governmental processes, and interests of the state.74
(3) Equal Protection: The Constitutionality of Federal Relocation
Provisions
To get away from the complicated evidentiary and jurisprudential
problems in challenging treatment by the local renewal agency, SRO's
could attack the constitutionality of the differential requirements for
replacement housing. As a matter of law under the Weicker Amend-
ment7 5 demolished units of singles are not required to be replaced.
SRO's might be able to persuade a court to invalidate this law because
it violates the Equal Protection Clause by treating single men arbi-
trarily with regard to statutory purpose.
The Weicker Amendment provides for one-to-one replacement of all
demolished low-income units for families without requiring replace-
ment of units formerly occupied by singles.1 6 But the exclusion of SRO's
from the Amendment is not rationally related to its legislative purpose.
One alternative, not yet accepted by any Supreme Court Justice, is a core of citizenship
rights for a subsistence standard of living or "minimum protection." The poor, like all
American citizens, would have a set of rights to a subsistence standard of living which
the State could not take away except for compelling reasons. Michelman, supra note 67,
Such an approach would involve the tremendous problem of setting viable minimum
standards in areas without clear-cut standards like educational opportunities. Moreover,
to assure minimum protection for all sub-groups of the poor, the Court would have to
direct the state to expend money on specific programs.
74. The courts may be interpreted to have begun already to develop a ranking
system. Developments, supra note 59, at 1120-21. On the other hand, the decision by the
Court in Dandridge v. xviliams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), has been construed to mean a tempo-
rary, if not permanent, stop to the development of a ranking system. Dienes, To Feed the
Hungry: Judicial Retrenchment in Welfare Adjudication, 58 CAL. L. REv. 555 (1970).
In any case, a ranking system, within the context of limited state funds, poses serious
jurisprudential problems since ranking in effect determines priorities for the allocation
of public monies. For example, in the cases on criminal appeals, the Court said that
the state had to provide funds for free counsel and free trial transcripts to indigents,
Douglas v. California, 372 US. 353 (1963), and Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 805 (1966). It
we assume that the state has a fixed amount of money to expend, the Court is
implicitly reducing state expenditures on other needs of the poor, like housing or health
programs. The more elaborate the judicial ranking system, the more it sets priorities for
allocation of funds among types of governmental expenditures. The problem Is that
allocation of public funds has traditionally been considered to be a legislative rather than
a judicial function.:
75. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1455(h).
76. Id.
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Mr. Weicker made clear on the House floor that the sole intent of his
amendment was to orient renewal more toward residential than com-
mercial or office development-7 Moreover, Mr. Weicker explicitly con-
strued his proposal as an extension of the 1968 Proxmire Amendment, 8
which provided low and moderate income housing in residential
renewal projects for singles as well as for families. Thus, there was no
justification for the Weicker Amendent, save accident, to exclude SRO's
from its benefits.
Even if SRO's could persuade a court to invalidate Weicker, they
might gain nothing for the effort and displaced families might lose all
their present benefits. The courts can only invalidate the statute. For
SRO's to obtain replacement housing, Congress would have to repass
the law in a form which included SRO's. But the Weicker Amendment
is only a recent fringe benefit for displaced families. It passed by a
small margin.79 It might very likely not be passed again.
C. The Uniform Relocation Act
Similarly, SRO's could have challenged the statutory basis for Ad-
ditional Relocation Payments (ARP) which excluded SRO's from
monetary benefits arbitrarily with regard to statutory purpose.89 But
Congress unexpectedly passed the Uniform Relocation Act in Decem-
ber, 1970,s ' removing the inequities in the allocation of monetary bene-
fits. The Uniform Relocation Act significantly increases displacement
benefits and makes these benefits available to all displaced persons.
The purpose of the Uniform Relocation Act is "to establish a uniform
policy for fair and equitable treatment of persons displaced ... as a
77. CONG. REc., 90th Cong., 2d Sess., at H9972 (Oct. 23, 1969).
78. 42 U.S.CA. § 1455(c)(2).
79. See note 77 supra.
80. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1465(c)(1). The statute denied ARP to all singles who werc not
elderly or disabled. But ARP was explicitly designed to give a displacce monetary as.
sistance in finding standard housing and paying higher rentals. HUD, Relocation Payment
Provisions Authorized by the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968--Initial
Policies and Requirements, p. 4, Jan. 23, 1969 (Circular 1370.3). SRO's should not have
been denied ARP because singles, like families, faced serious problems in finding nel,
residences at what for them would be reasonable prices. ARP was already structured to
take into consideration different types of relocatees since it was based on a formula
graduated according to the normal market price for each type of displacce rental. Id. at
8-9. If families in fact needed more assistance or faced higher rent increases than SRO's,
the families would have been given larger amounts of money than single men.
.81. The House version of the Uniform Relocation Act was passed under suspended
rules of order;, the bill was not put on the regular House docket because it was not
expected to come out of committee this year. CONG. REC., 91st Cong., 2d Seas., at
H11216-25 (Dec. 7, 1970). The Uniform Relocation Act was part of the 1970 Housing
and Urban Development Act, Pub. Law 91-1656, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 1970 [hereinafter
cited-as URA].
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result of programs designed for the benefit of the public as a whole." 82
To fulfill this purpose, Congress made clear that full relocation benefits
should be given to any displaced "individual, partnership, corporation,
or association."8 3
As a displaced individual, each SRO is eligible to receive up to $300
for the costs of moving and for any "direct losses of tangible personal
property as a result of moving."8 4 Each SRO is eligible to receive a dis-
location allowance of $200, as direct compensation for having been
forced to move in order that some program could be accomplished for
the community as a whole.85
SRO's are also eligible for a replacement housing stipend, The pur-
pose of the stipend is to provide a displacee with enough money to pay
for a standard housing unit in an area reasonably accessible to public
utilities, commercial facilities, as well as to his place of employment.
One form of the stipend is a rent subsidy of up to $4000 spread over
a maximum of four years following displacement.8 7 The second form of
the replacement housing stipend is a flat sum of up to $2000 to make a
down-payment for the purchase of a standard housing unit and to
cover incidental expenses like recording fees and closing costs.88 More-
over, the federal government will match on a dollar for dollar basis up
to another $2000 any personal funds a displaced person applies toward
a down-payment.89
With the new federal statute, displaced SRO's will be eligible for
more monetary benefits than before, though two related problems still
remain. First, the Uniform Relocation Act specifically states the former
administrative rule that displacees cannot receive any supplementary
82. URA § 201.
83. URA § 101(5).
84. URA § 202.
85. URA § 202(B); statutory purpose was ascertained in a telephone conversation with
Richard Sullivan, Counsel for the House Committee on Public Works, which drew np
the legislative basis for the Uniform Relocation Act, Dec. 24, 1970.
86. URA § 204.
87. URA § 204(l). This form of replacement housing stipend is clearly patterned after
ARP, which made up the difference between the rent for a standard unit and 25% of
tenant income, so the replacement housing stipend will probably be applied according
to this same administrative rule.
For a discussion of ARP, see note 80 supra. The 25% rule for the replacement housing
stipend would mean that a displaced SRO who moved into public housing or began to
receive rent supplements would not receive a stipend, since both programs require that
he pay no more than 25% of his income for rent. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1410(g), 1701s. Thus,
the stipend would be used only if a displaced SRO moved into housing in the private
market.
88. URA § 204(a).
89. Id. This second form of the replacement housing stipend permits a displaced per-
son to take advantage of the homeownership programs for low-income dwellings estab-
lished by the federal government through interest subsidies in 1968. See pp. 421-22 in! ra.
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relocation payments unless they have lived at the same address for 90
days consecutively before displacement. 0 Since SRO's may not have
enough money to sleep every night at their regular hotel, or may move
occasionally from hotel to hotel, they may often be legally ineligible
for any supplementary relocation payment. Second, the Act appears to
approve by its silence the current administrative practice of giving a flat
sum of $5 for moving expenses to singles without furniture. 1 While
many SRO's without furniture must bear the substantial costs of search-
ing for a new residence involved with moving, the Act grants search
costs only to displaced businesses and farms.92
While the Uniform Relocation Act makes significant improvements
in monetary benefits for SRO's, it does not provide them with suitable
replacement housing. The Act does not create new housing programs
or allocate more funds to housing construction.0 3 The Act does not
eliminate the requirement of a costly and burdensome market survey
before a local agency can construct a new hotel in the renewal area.,"
Nor does the Act include in its description of a proper replacement unit
any criteria of suitability to social needs. 9 Without such criteria,
SRO's could easily be placed in large housing projects composed entirely
of nuclear families.
Most important, the new act, like the former renewal law, requires
only that a local agency give assurances that suitable relocation housing
will be available.96 If, as has often happened in the past, such assurances
are illusory,97 SRO's can turn only to the courts. In this forum, SRO's
are no better off than before the Act's passage. The Act clearly leaves
judicial review-both in terms of problems of proof and standard of
review-in exactly the same state as it was before this legislation. 3
SRO's still face the same difficulties with making effective arguments
based on violations of renewal law or on the Equal Protection Clause 0
90. URA § 204.
91. See note 41 supra.
92. URA § 202(a)(3).
93. The Act does, however, have a provision which allows the federal government at
its discretion to allocate money out of the funds for the renewal project to help finance
the construction of housing for relocatees. URA § 206.
94. See note 46 supra.
95. See notes 43-44 supra.
96. URA § 205 (c)(3).
97. See Hearings on H.R. 14898 before the House Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong..
2d Sess., March 5. 1970 (testimony of Edgar S. Cahn).
98. CoNG. REG., 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at S20463 (Dec. 17, 1970).
99. In order to widen the scope of judicial review for low-income displacees like
SRO's, the Senate passed its version of the Uniform Relocation Act with a provision that
all displaced persons could bring actions in federal district courts under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA). 5 U.S.C.A. § 706. For the text of the Senate version see S.I,
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If the Uniform Relocation Act had in fact carried out its purpose of
equalizing the treatment of all displaced groups, it would have ex-
tended the Weicker Amendment to cover SRO's. Not only would
extension of the Weicker Amendment go a long way toward insuring the
existence of adequate replacement housing, but it would also greatly
reduce the proof problem in the event sufficient replacement housing
was not provided. The Weicker Amendment requires that there shall
be one-to-one replacement of demolished low-income family units by
the construction or rehabilitation of new low-income units. °10 By focus-
ing on the provision of new units, instead of vacancies in the existing
private market, the Weicker Amendment significantly changes the na-
ture of the proof needed to show a violation of the relocation act. SRO's
would have to demonstrate only that no new units had been built for
them rather than that the existing housing market could not absorb
displacees of their income level in a projected time period.
III. SRO's and Federal Housing Subsidies
The provision of monetary benefits does not create replacement
housing, and the ultimate success of relocation for SRO's depends on its
availability. One possible source is the private housing market. Under
the Uniform Relocation Act, SRO's would be given a replacement
housing stipend of up to $4000 spread over four years to help make
up the difference between 25% of their income and the rental for a
private standard unit.10 1 But in practice, SRO's cannot find standard
units on the private market. There are no new residential hotels being
constructed; and existing residential hotels are usually overcrowded,
substandard, or themselves slated for demolition. Most SRO's would
not want to live in a private apartment house composed only of nuclear
91st Cong., 2d Sess., § 401 (before House Amendments). On the other hand, the House
version of the Uniform Relocation Act contained a provision that explicitly barred
judicial review of all final determinations of relocation questions by the appropriate
agency head. See the House version of S.1, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., § 201(a). As a compro.
rise, both provisions were eliminated.
While the House provision on judicial review clearly would hurt the chances of
SRO's in obtaining their rightful benefits, it is not clear whether the Senate version wotild
have given SRO's or other displacees any more effective judicial remedies than the final
compromise. The APA instructs the reviewing court to employ several criteria in.
eluding both the abuse of discretion and rational purpose standards, already used In
relocation cases for alleged violations of the renewal statute or the Equal Protection
clause. The only new criterion which would be applicable to relocation cases is the
substantial evidence rule. 5 U.S.C.A. § 706. This rule has been interpreted in adminis.
trative cases to mean a general test of reasonability not dissimilar to abuse of discretion
or rational purpose. K. DAVis, AMtNISnATIVv PROCESS 915 (1951).
100. See pp. 4101 supra.
101. See p. 412 supra.
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families; and most private landlords would be unwilling to rent to
SRO's, who are seen as social deviants. Moreover, even if SRO's were
allowed to rent a standard private unit, after four years many would no
longer be able to meet monthly payments.
If SRO's are to be sheltered properly, they must be provided with
standard housing in the public sector. The ultimate success of any
relocation statute is inextricably tied to the structure of federal housing
subsidies. But the existing federal programs pose nearly insurmountable
barriers to their use by SRO's. While the recently passed Moorhead
Bill was originally designed to remove these barriers, the bill is at best
a halfvay solution to SRO housing problems.
A. Barriers to SRO Use of Current Federal Programs
In the past, cities have been unable to construct new housing without
federal aid. Their efforts in the area of low and moderate income housing
have been therefore conditioned by the nature and quantity of available
federal subsidies. While cities have always been constrained in using
federal housing subsidies by red tape and inadequate funding, they have
been faced with three special problems in attempting to use federal
programs to serve SRO's. First, practically all federal housing programs
did not allow construction of hotel-type buildings with common bath-
room and dining facilities.10 2 Second, statutory eligibility requirements
barred SRO's from many federal housing programs. If SRO's were not
elderly or disabled, they were generally ineligible for existing federal
shelter subsidies. Third, even if a few SRO's were eligible for certain
programs under specific legal exceptions, practical difficulties often
prevented even these SRO's from utilizing existing subsidies.
(1) Federal Rental Programs
Three programs have been historically aimed at supplying low and
moderate income rental housing. The oldest program is public hous-
ing,0 3 which has been the core of the country's efforts to provide low-
102. See uNim rum PROPERTY STANDARDS FOR Low.Cosr HousiNG (HUD PG-i Oct. 1966);
REHABILTATION GUME FOR REsIDENTAL PROPERTES (HUD PG-50 Jan. 1968). For a dis-
cussion of the design limitations in public housing, see Ledbetter, Public Housing-A
Social Experiment Seeks Acceptance, 32 Lw & CoNmssP. PROB. 490, 497-501 (1967). The
only programs which are flexible enough for a hotel-type building are housing for the
elderly and college housing. PROPERTY STANDARDS FOR TiE ELDERLY (HUD PG-46 Oct.
1965); COLLEGE HousING PRoGRAM (HUD PG-3 Aug. 1966).
. Since the former design limitations were clear-cut, they will not be examined in this
section. For a- detailed comparison between apartments and hotel-type buildings, see note
146 infra.
103. 42 US.C.A. §§ 1401-36.
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income units for years. A more recent program, rent supplements, 104
was enacted to circumvent some of the practical barriers in the public
housing program. Rent supplements are given only to tenants in
Section 236 multifamily dwellings,05 which are constructed by either
non-profit groups or limited dividend corporations. Except for the
rent supplement tenants, 236 housing is mainly aimed at rental by
moderate income residents.
Public Housing. In traditional public housing, project construction
is financed through bonds issued by the local housing authority, the
interest and principal of which are paid by the federal government."
Operational and maintenance expenses remain primarily the local
authority's obligation, to be met from the rents of tenants. 07 Within
the last few years, HUD has also developed two new types of public
housing. In the leased public housing program, 0" the local authority
rents units from private owners which are then sublet to low-income
tenants under the same conditions as units in traditional housing
projects. The Turnkey series 1 gives the local housing authority the
flexibility of contracting out to private firms for construction or manage-
ment, as well as the possibility of selling units to project tenants.
SRO's are not eligible for any of these programs unless they are
elderly, disabled, or displaced by any federally sponsored program.110
Despite this legal exception in the requirements, even eligible
104. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1701s.
105. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1715z-1.
106. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401-1436.
107. PUBLIc HOUSING ADMINISTRATION, Low-RENT MANUAL 8217.1 (5) (1962). The Brooke
Amendment in 1969 increased the federal funds provided to local authorities, but led to
administrative rules reducing local revenues by limiting rents to 25% of tenant income.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1410(b) and (g). See note 156 infra.
108. Under § 23 leased housing, the local authority agrees to lease units from a
private developer or owner. The lease states that at the end of a given time period
the authority can purchase units from the private landlord for its own use or for resale
to the tenants.
For a detailed discussion of this program, see EDSON, HOMEOWNERSHIP FOR LoW.INCOME1
FAMimL.s (1969), at 19-24 (National Legal Aid and Defender Ass'n Monograph Series
3, 1969) [hereinafter cited as EDSON]; Burstein, New Techniques in Public Housing, 32
LAw & CONTEMP. PaoD. 528, 540-55 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Burstein]; Note, Govern-
ment Housing Assistance to Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 508 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Govern-
ment Housing]; and Friedman and Krier, A New Lease on Life: Section 23 Housing and
the Poor, 116 U. PA. L. Rzv. 611 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Section 23 Housing].
109. Under the Turnkey I program, housing officials can hire a private builder to
construct units for the authority. The officials choose tenants to pay the normal level
of public housing rents. Then the authority begins to run the project or turns it over
to a management firm under the Turnkey II program. Finally, under Turnkey III, the
authority can sell units to its tenants. When a tenant contributes a down payment of
at least $350, by self-maintenance of his unit or some other form of "sweat equity," he
is given a lease-purchase contract which allows him to own his unit within twenty-five
years. For a detailed discussion of the turnkey programs, see Burstein, supra note 108,
at 529-40 and EDSON, supra note 108, at 7-14.
110. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1402.
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SRO's rarely move into public housing projects."' SRO's them-
selves may find traditional public housing undesirable. Accustomed to
living in relatively small hotels with other singles, SRO's may not like
large public housing projects composed mainly of nuclear or female-
headed families. More importantly, public housing authorities do not
want SRO's as tenants. These authorities must operate their projects
on 25% of their tenants' income, and SRO's are usually in the lowest
ranges of eligible incomes. Local authorities also do not want SRO's
because they are often conceived to be social deviants.u - Public housing
boards are composed mainly of professional men from banking, busi-
ness, or real estate, who have historically sought tenants whose behavior
conforms to their norms, or at least to the norms of other tenants in
the projects so as to minimize social disturbances.=3 To pressure SRO's
into reforming or moving out, housing officials have a large range of
tools, including fines for petty abuses, large repair charges tacked into
rent bills, and evictions on vaguely defined grounds like "immoral or
dangerous activity."114
In the new programs of leased housing and the Turnkey series, SRO's
are even more at the mercy of unreceptive housing officials. No public
authority is required to make use of either program; and no private
landlord or developer can be forced to lease units or construct buildings.
IlI. For example, in Pittsburgh, of the 3,581 single persons displaced by renewal
activity, only 192 were accommodated in public housing. Hearings on Housing and Urban
Development Legislation-1970 Before the Housing Subcomn. of the House Banking and
Currency Comm., 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 318 (1970) (testimony of William Farkas).
112. Many commentators have noted that housing officials want to inculate middle-
class standards in the residents of public housing. In carrying out these paternalistic
policies, the officials have a large range of formal and informal weapons. See Government
Housing, supra note 108, at 508-15; Schoshinski, Public Landlords and Tenants: A Suiey
of the Developing Law, 1969 DuKE L.J. 599.
113. Hartman and Carr, Housing Authorities Reconsidered, 35 J. A.n. l,,r. PL%.%-
,NERs 10, 12 (1969).
114. But recently the Supreme Court has made clear that public housing authorities
are governmental agents who must not use their power to abridge constitutional free.
doms. The Court has been ready to look behind the reasons given by housing officials to
prevent retaliatory evictions for the exercise of First Amendment rights, like organizing
tenants groups. Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 US. 268 (1969). A court has also in-
validated illegitimacy of children as the sole criterion for rejecting applicants on both
due process and equal protection grounds. Thomas v. Housing Authority, 282 F. Supp.
575 (E.D. Ark. 1967).
Moreover, in Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970),
the court has given tenants in public housing a full array of procedural protections.
Before eviction, tenants must be given notice of the misconduct thought to be objec-
tionable; access to their entire rental folders when the whole folder is being considered
to determine eligibility; an opportunity to confront and cross-examine persons w-ho sup-
plied information for the tenant's folder; knowledge of the rules governing the hearing
concerning termination; and a chance to present his side before an impartial official, not
the project manager who instituted the eviction action.
For a discussion of landlord-tenant law in public housing projects before Escalera see
Schoshinski, supra note 112; Note, Public Landlords and Private Tenants: The Eviction
of "Undesirables" from Public Housing Projects, 77 YAE LJ. 988 (1968).
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When leased housing or the Turnkey series are actually implemented,
SRO's will rarely be chosen as tenants. Authorities search out the most
"respectable" tenants because the projects are experimental.1"8 In leased
housing, the private landlord generally has the right to select tenants.110
In both programs, local authorities regularly screen applicants on the
basis of their household habits." 7
Rent Supplements. In this program, HUD pays rent supplements for
low-income tenants directly to eligible private sponsors. The supple-
ments make up the difference between the actual rent and 25% of
tenant income-the same rate paid in public housing.""' Because rent
supplements bypass local housing authorities, the program has been
so bogged down in controversy that it has never been properly funded11"
SRO's are eligible for rent supplements only if they are elderly, dis-
abled, or displaced by a federally supported renewal project.120 Again,
however, practical barriers make its use by even these SRO's unlikely.
It is impossible to build a residential hotel under this program alone
because supplements are generally available to only 40% of the tenants
in any one building.1'2 This legislatively contrived scarcity is aggravated
by the program's gross underfunding which has led to administrative
rationing among would-be participants in some regions. With so few
subsidies available for any one building, there is a strong tendency for
private sponsors to choose the "cream" of the poor rather than SRO's.
Section 236 Program for Multifamily Dwellings. Under the 236
program,12 2 the federal government provides eligible private sponsors
with interest subsidies which reduce the interest rate on commercially
obtained mortages to 1%. The 236 program is aimed at constructing
apartments, including cooperatives, at low and moderate rental levels.
Eligible tenants may not earn more than 135% of the maximum income
limits for local public housing.
SRO access to the 236 program is initially restricted by statutory
115. Section 23 Housing, supra note 108, at 622. Also, the leased housing program Is
not designed to promote the construction of whole buildings for low-income person.,
One of the program's main purposes is to promote racial and economic integration.
With certain exceptions, the law thus limits leased housing units to 10% of the units Ili
any one building. 42 US.C.A. § 1421b(c).
116. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1421b(d)(1).
117. Section 23 Housing, supra note 108, at 622; EDsoN, supra note 108, at 10-11.
118. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1701s (Supp. I, 1965). For a full discussion of the program, see
Government Housing, supra note 108, at 518-35.
119. Estimated expenditures on rent supplements were only $23 million for 1969-70, 27
J. OF HOUSING 70 (1970), though the 1969 appropriations had not used up $68 million of
the original authorization. 27 J. OF HoUsING 17 (1970).
120. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1701s(c).
121.. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1701s(h)(1)(c).
122. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1715z-1.
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eligibility requirements. Only 10% of the units in a 236 project can
generally be used for singles who are not elderly or disabled.2 Further,
as in the other programs, there are practical difficulties which make
even the statutory 10% figure illusory. These difficulties derive from the
nature of sponsors eligible for the interest subsidies. These sponsors may
be of two types-non-profit groups and limited dividend corporations. 24
Non-profit groups are usually churches or civic organizations which
construct housing for the local community without any monetary re-
turns. In contrast, eligible limited dividend corporations are business
ventures which have agreed to earn no more than a 6% return on their
investment.
Neither the non-profit nor the limited dividend sponsor have much
incentive to use the 236 program to house eligible SRO's. Non-profit
groups lack the resources and expertise needed to build large apartments
or residential hotels.- 5 In their first seven years of existence, non-profit
groups generated less than 75,000 housing units throughout the entire
country.' - These units tend to go to the particular constituency of the
church or highly publicized minority groups like blacks.
Limited dividend corporations are even less likely than non-profit
groups to construct units for SRO's. With other business investments
promising returns significantly higher than 6%, limited dividend
corporations have not been able to attract large amounts of capital. In
the few projects built, SRO's are not welcome because they cannot
afford the higher rents necessary to yield a 6% profit. While Congress
has recently added tax incentives for limited dividend corporations
that undertake housing rehabilitation, 27 these incentives offer slim
chances of increasing the supply of housing for SRO's. Unless HUD
123. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1715z-10)(5)(c).
124. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1715z-l(j)(3).
125. P. NmnBNca & J. POPE, RES-EiAL REHABLITATiON: T Pn7Aus or No.%-Pnorrr
SpoNsosmip ch. 10 (1968) [hereinafter cited as NmBANcr & POPE].
126. The 236 program, passed in 1968, was an outgrowth of the 221(d)(3) Below., Mar-
ket Interest Rate (BMIR) program which had been started in 1961 to promote con-
struction and rehabilitation of units. 12 U.S.C.A. § 17151. Like 221(d)(3) BMIR, 236 housing
provides interest subsidies to non-profit sponsors. But in this program the interest rate is
reduced to 1%, no state or federal agency can be a sponsor, and the loan itself is taken out
from a private bank rather than from the government.
From 1961 to 1964 at interest rates of up to 4V/,%, the 221(d)(3) WMIR program financed
a total of 24,297 new units and 3,093 rehabilitated ones. In 1965 the interest rate was
reduced to 3%. Starts under the program in 1965-67 totaled 50,307 for all types of units.
U.S. DEPARnm-r OF HousiNG AN*'D URiA DEVELOPMENT, STATISTICAL YEAr.0oo 90.1 (1967);
and Government Housing, supra note 108, at 515-18. In 1968, Congress began the 236
program at 1% and continued the 221(d)(3) BMIR program at 3%. In fisral 1970, con-
struction and major rehabilitation starts were 16,500 units under 236 and 30,000 units
under 221(d)(5) BAIlR. 27 J. oF HousING 70 (1970).
127.. Section 167(K) of the Internal Revenue Code, enacted by the Tax Reform Act of
1969. Pub. L No. 91-172, § 521(a), 85 Stat. 651.
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administratively limits the tax concessions to rehabilitation of low-in-
come housing, limited dividend sponsors will naturally repair buildings




There have been three major programs for the achievement of home.
ownership by the federal government. 29 After World War II, the fed-
eral government began the home mortgage insurance program through
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), a program designed pri-
marily for the middle class. In 1968, the federal government created the
235 program, which is oriented toward homeownership for low-income
families, and the 237 program, which is aimed at homeownership for
those low-income people with poor credit histories.
FHA Guarantee of Home Mortgages. FHA provides federal insur-
ance on home loans for eligible holders of a commercial mortgage 3 0
But FHA guarantees are of no value to SRO's since an amendment to
the statute explicitly forbids FHA to grant or insure mortgages on any
hotels, 131 whether they serve the wealthy or the poor. Although the pur-
pose of the amendment was to protect luxury hotels from competitive
threats financed by the federal government, 132 Congress made no excep-
tion for low-income hotels that catered to SRO's.
In Federal Housing Administration v. Darlington,"' the Supreme
Court had occasion to construe the statutory language forbidding FHA
128. Note, Accelerated Depreciation for Housing Rehabilitation, 79 YA=~a L.J. 961 (1970).
An additional problem is the apparent inability to "cash out" an investment. While the
shelter created by the accelerated depreciation may be attractive, the long term pros ects
for rehabilitated low-income housing are generally poor. Unless a method is created by
which an investor may cash out of the building without all prior tax benefits being
recaptured, and without having to hold the property so long as to create unreasonable
risk, the program is unlikely to attract substantial capital.
129. For a discussion of all three programs, see Sengstock & Senstock, Homeowner-
ship: A Goal for All Americans, 46 J. oF URBAN LAw 313 (1969).
130. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1709.
131. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1731b.
132. This provision in the FHA mandate was inserted by Congress in 1954 at the
request of the American Hotel Association, a trade organization for owners of luxury
hotels. The Association complained that the hotel business was in serious financial
trouble. The section was designed to ease the Association's fears of increased competition
from the conversion of new federally assisted housing into hotel units. Owners of low-
income hotels of course did not have the resources to lobby in Washington, and tile
Hotel Association did not consider the housing problems of single men. See, Hearings on
S. 2889, S. 2938, and S. 2949 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess., at 654-61 (1954). Compare the Association's suggested amendment, at 659,
with the wording of 12 U.S.C.A. § 1731b.
133. 358 U.S. 84 (1958). The case involved the validity of a FHA.insured mortgage
for an apartment complex which had in part been turned into a hotel.
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insurance of hotel mortgages, and exacerbated an already adverse situa-
tion for SRO's. Not satisfied to base its holdings on the limiting amend-
ment alone, the Court declared that the amendments statutory language
only expressed the original intent of the act creating the FHA's power to
finance and insure mortgages. 134 In short, the federal government had
never been authorized to help construct low-income hotels. The Court
reasoned that the original law allowed mortgage insurance for any
"dwelling" which could mean only a "permanent residence." Since the
word "dwelling" appears in almost all federal housing statutes, this
interpretation would prohibit federal aid to residential hotels even if
all present restrictions on housing programs were abolished. Such a
result would be contrary to both the usual meaning of "dwelling" 3 r
and the Congressional goal of providing decent housing for the poor.130
Section 235 Program. The 235 program137 offers interest subsidies to
those persons with incomes no higher than 135% of the maximum in-
come for public housing in the local area. The program includes the
purchase of one or two-family homes as well as the acquisition of a
condominium unit. Section j of the 235 program1 38 allows public bodies
or non-profit sponsors to build units and turn them over to low and
moderate income persons for purchase under the program. In either
the normal 235 program or under section j, an eligible purchaser
134. Id. at 87.
135. The dictionary defines dwelling as "a building or other shl ter in which people
live." WBST 'S SE ,EI NEW CoLLEGATE DicriONARY 259 (197). In other contexts, state
courts have defined dwelling in a broader manner than the Darlington Court. "'Dwelling
house' is a very flexible term. Its meaning depends not only on context, but on the
determination of the courts not to permit public policy or justice to be defeated by a
word." BLAcK's LAW DICtiONARY 596 (1951), citing as authority Daniels v. Commonwealth.
172 Va. 583, 1 S.E.2d 833, 335 (1939). "[Dwelling] may include an apartment building, or
any structure used by human beings, partly for business and partly for residential
purposes, or a building regardless of habitation." BLAc.'s LAw DICTiO.ARY 596 (1951).
citing as authority Gerstell v. Knight, 345 Pa. 83, 26 A.2d 329, 330 (1942).
136. SRO's might argue that this Congressional policy, together with a later decision
of a lower court, created an exception to the Darlington rule whicl might be extended to
the owners of low-income hotels. In Hardy v. Savannah Apartments, Inc., 217 F. Supp.
649 (S.D. Ga. 1962), the court allowed FHA to insure the mortgage of an apartment owner
in serious financial difficulties even though he converted some units to hotel rooms. The
court reasoned that the owner should not lose money because lie had contructcd tile
apartments in accordance with an important public policy-the alleviation of the
housing shortage after World War IL Since Congress now considers the construction of
low-income units an important public policy, the courts could allow FHA to subsidize
the building of low-income hotels.
There is, however, an ambivalence in the Congressional housing policy toward in-
dividuals, as opposed to families. The basic housing goal, as determined by 42 U.S.C.A. §
1401, is "to remedy the unsafe and unsanitary housing conditions ... for families . . .
that are injurious to the health, safety, and morals of the citizens of the Nation."
(Emphasis addecL)
137. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1715z.
138. 12 U.S.CA. § 1715zj).
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obtains a loan from a private bank within a given rate of interest. The
federal government insures the loan and pays the bank the difference
between the actual interest rate and a 1% rate.
While SRO's are legally eligible for the 235 program, in practice they
are precluded from utilizing its subsidies. To participate in the 235
program, SRO's must first obtain a loan from a private bank. For most
SRO's, this would be an impossible task since they have such poor
credit histories or irregular sources of incomes. Even if SRO's could
obtain a loan, they would not be able to afford the cost of a one or two-
family house. Although the 235 program would allow SRO's to pur-
chase a condominium unit, the law requires that the unit be in a
building not less than two years old,130 and most recent condominium
projects are designed for moderate or high-income tenants. Besides,
SRO's might not want to move into a family-oriented condominium,
without other singles or communal facilities in which to congregate.
For SRO's, the 235 program's only remote possibility is section j.
This section would permit public agencies or private sponsors to obtain
financing, construct a large building, and then turn all condominium
units over to SRO's only. But there is no reason to believe that housing
officials and private sponsors would utilize this relatively experimental
and complicated section when they have failed to provide housing for
SRO's under standard, straight-forward programs.
Section 237 Program. The 237 program140 offers all of the benefits of
the 235 program to those persons with irregular credit histories or
income patterns. Applicants for the 237 program are specially approved
by a HUD representative who is supposed to aid the applicant in ob.
taining a mortgage and then offer budget, debt-management, and related
counseling services. As in the 235 program, the federal government pays
the difference between the actual mortgage rate and a 1% rate.
While SRO's seem exactly the type of person that the 237 program was
designed to serve, 237 subsidies are by statute available only for fami-
lies, particularly families living in public housing projects.' 41 Moreover,
HUD has not received any funding for the budget, debt-management
and counseling services. Even if SRO's were eligible, they would have
to obtain their mortgages and handle financing on their own.142
139. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1715z(i).
140. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1715z-2.
141. Id.
142. HUD, HUD Programs, 33 (SP/MP.78 June 1969).
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B. The Moorhead Bill
The Moorhead Bill, 43 as passed, was intended to eliminate the gap
between the federal requirement for standard relocation units and the
architectural, legal and practical obstacles to the only conceivable source
of such units for SRO's-the federal housing programs. Yet, the bill
provides only a partial solution to the architectural limitations on
existing programs and leaves untouched almost all the legal and prac-
tical barriers.
(1) Architectural Requirements
The existing architectural regulations for federal housing programs
require each unit to include bathroom and kitchen facilities within a
minimum floor space of about three hundred square feet.144 Even if
single men were eligible for all present housing programs, such design
limitations would force both SRO's and the federal government to pay
for unnecessary space. A bedroom of one hundred square feet, with the
same amount per person donated to bathrooms and other forms of
common space would satisfactorily meet SRO needs.145 Yet the addi-
tional one hundred feet required by legal minimums increase the cost
of construction by about $2800 for each new unit and $1600 for each
rehabilitated one.148
143. Pub. Law No. 91-1656, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter cited as Moor-
head Bill].
144. See note 102 supra.
145. Interview with Robert Knight, architect for the Student Community Housing
Corporation's project for SRO's in New Haven, March 19, 1970.
146. Traditional construction costs run about $28 per square foot. Prefabricated con-
struction is, of course, less expensive, but may be unavailable because of union practices
in the building trades. Rehabilitation costs run about $16 per square foot, though
demonstration projects have reduced the price to below $10 per square fool Estimates
of construction costs are from the office of Charles loore, Dean of the School of Archi-
tecture at Yale University. For rehabilitation costs, see Quirk, WVein, and Gomberg. A
Draft Program of Housing Reform-the Tenant Condominium, 53 CORNE.L L. RE'. 361,
379-87 (1968); NtmAxcrK & POPE, supra note 125, at ch. 7.
To illustrate the cost differential between apartments and dormitory-type buildings,
take a plot of land worth about $7000, which is large enough to contain a two-story
building of 6,125 sq. ft. per story. Below is an extremely simplified sketch of two build-
ings: the first along the legal minimums, the second according to actual SRO space
needs. For a more sophisticated design of a SRO-type building, see Levy, supra note 4,
at 576-80; Community Design Center, supra note 53.
For new construction (at $28 per square foot), Plan I would cost 8675 per peron,
while Plan 1I would cost $5000 per person (both prices include the cost of land). If
these buildings were financed at 1% over 30 years (offered by the 235 and 236 programs),
Plan I would cost about $27.93 per person per month, while Plan II would be $16.10
per month. To this must be added the cost of maintenance, taxes and insurance each
month, $21 per person for Plan I and $12 per person for Plan II ($480 per building
per year).
For rehabilitation (at $16 per square foot with the same financing terms as the con-
struction example), the cost of Plan I is $15.78 per person per month; the price of
Plan II would be $9.02 per person per month. Again, the monthly costs of maintenance,
taxes and insurance must be added.
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At the same time, hotel-type buildings with common spaces can be
much more easily adapted to SRO's needs than buildings constructed
according to existing design regulations. A large common room could
The cost differential is crucial for low-income SRO's. City planners suggest that 20.25%,,
of total income should be spent on rent. A higher percentage means cutbacks In needed
food or clothing. The average monthly income of SRO's is about $120 per month. Boovti,
supra note 1, at 10-15. Thus, for new construction, Plan I would absorb 41% of SRO
income while Plan II would take up only 23%. For rehabilitation, Plan I would run
about 31%; Plan II would be as low as 18%. (These percentages are based on total
monthly costs including insurance, taxes, and maintenance.)
I. APARTMENT DESIGN
(entry-12 2 sq. ft.)
ri1-i m__ II_ m-
20"
200 1
Apartments for SRO's at 300 sq. ft. legal minimum. The plan provides
for 40 SRO's in a total of 12,250 sq. ft. This floor plan is for both stories.









ond 15 100 15 100 15
or
10 bedrooms 10 bedrooms
10 bedrooms 10 bedrooms
i 245 >1
Hotel building at 100 sq. ft. per bedroom with 100 sq. ft. per person
donated to common space. The plan provides for 70 SRO's in a total
of 12,250 sq. ft. (All measurements in feet.)
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be used for job training during the day, a hot meal in the evening, and
remedial skill courses at night. Indeed, programs which have actually
been operated in a residential hotel include a living center for parolees,
a halfway house for mental patients, a cooperative grocery store, as
well as a physical base for different types of community organizations.1
47
The Moorhead Bill partially resolves the problems of existing design
requirements by providing for funding of projects in which all or part
of the dwelling units do not contain kitchens in both the 236 and rent
supplements programs.14 As to public housing, the bill as passed pro-
vides for units without kitchens, with common dining rooms only for
"elderly families."' 49 But the bill as passed leaves out the clause "com-
mon bathrooms and other common facilities," which was contained in
the original House bill as reported out of committee.50 If residential
hotels are going to be successfully constructed under these three housing
programs, the buildings will need common bathrooms to keep down
construction costs and large lobbies so that SRO's will have a place to
congregate. By permitting units without kitchens but not allowing din-
ing facilities for SRO's, the bill as passed fails to attack the very basic
lack of decent and cheap meals for SRO's. Moreover, the bill as passed
fails to encourage housing sponsors to provide space for rehabilitation
programs like job training or medical facilities.' 5
(2) Legal Eligibility
The Moorhead Bill as passed makes SRO's who are elderly, disabled,
or displaced from a federally supported project legally eligible for the
public housing, rent supplements, and 236 program.152 But elderly and
disabled persons were always eligible for all three programs; and dis-
placed persons were always legally permitted to enter public housing
and rent supplements projects. The only real difference is that the
proportion of SRO's in 236 housing is no longer limited to 10% if there
are more than that number of displaced single men who want to take
advantage of the program.
In the original Moorhead Bill, public housing, rent supplements, and
147. See The Seattle Plan, supra note 8; Shapiro, supra note 4.
148. Moorhead Bill, § 114.
149. Id., § 207.
150. H.R. 19436, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). For the text of the original bill, see
CONG. R.c., 91st Cong., 2d Sess., H11034-5 (Dec. 2, 1970).
151. The public housing section includes some general language about the "special
needs" of SRO's; but the section narrowly defines SRO housing in terms of units without
kitchens.
152. foorhead Bill, §§ 114 and 207.
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236 housing would have been legally available to all SRO's.153 The
provisions of the original bill gave local governments an incentive to
break away from the municipal policy of containment by giving city
officials federal subsidies to build new housing for all SRO's. Under the
bill as passed, local officials will have no incentive to reach many SRO's
who are not displaced by federally subsidized projects but have been
forced to live in apartments or on the streets because there were not
enough residential hotels.
(3) Practical Barriers
Even for the elderly, disabled, or displaced SRO's who are eligible for
residential hotels built under federal subsidies, there remain serious
practical barriers.
Low-income hotels for these privileged SRO's can now be constructed
under the public housing program. But the decision to take advantage
of the Moorhead Bill as passed remains completely within the discretion
of local housing officials. These are the same men from the same pro-
fessional background who have historically viewed SRO's with dis-
taste.15 4 At the same time, these officials have not been given any added
economic incentives to build for SRO's. SRO's still have very low
incomes and are required to pay only 25% of their income for rent.
The running of a residential hotel with dining facilities will only add
to the economic burden imposed by SRO's on the local housing au-
thority. The Moorhead Bill as passed does provide that all extra ex-
penses incurred in running a residential hotel can be included as
operating costs. 55 But housing officials must pay for the operating costs
of a residential hotel, like those of all other public housing projects,
mainly out of revenues. While the Housing and Urban Development
Act of 1970 allows the federal government to subsidize the operat-
ing costs of local projects, the Act does not supply a large enough
appropriation to make a significant impact on the structure of public
housing financing.so
The Moorhead Bill does, however, provide an alternative to the pub.
lic housing program by allowing a second method of constructing
residential hotels-rent supplements in 236 projects built by limited
dividend or non-profit sponsors. But like the public housing approach,
this method of housing SRO's is still burdened with the same practical
153. See note 150 supra.
154. See p. 417 supra.
155. Moorhead Bill, § 207.
156. Id., § 210.
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barriers that existed before. While the Moorhead Bill does make SRO's
eligible for the current rent supplements program, it does not provide
any new economic incentives for sponsors of 236 programs to accept
SRO's. There are no additional funds allocated to the rent supplements
program ear-marked for SRO's. Since the program is already oversub-
scribed and underfunded,0 T there is no reason to believe that scarce
supplements will be given in significant amounts to newcomers on the
federal housing scene. More importantly, the proposed legislation does
not change the requirement that no more than 40% of the tenants in
any one building can receive rent supplements,15 8 so a residential hotel
still cannot be constructed under this program alone. To finance the
remaining 60% of the units, eligible SRO's will have to rely on the
same incentives operative under the 236 program before the Moorhead
Bill.
While the new law eases architectural limits to allow limited dividend
sponsors to build residential hotels under the regular 236 program, it
does not alter or remove the economic disincentives which have in the
past discouraged such sponsors from housing SRO's. Limited dividend
sponsors must look to rent rolls to secure the legal maximum return of
6%. Without any special subsidies for very low-income tenants like
SRO's, limited dividend sponsors will continue to construct apartments
for moderate-income tenants in the highest eligible income category.20
The only remaining alternative for SRO's under the bill is sponsor-
ship of 236 housing by non-profit groups. But again the proposed legis-
lation ignores the practical barriers which have prevented non-profit
groups from serving SRO's under existing programs. The bill takes no
steps to build up the resources or expertise of these amateur housing
sponsors.' 60 Since most non-profit groups are used to construct projects
of about a dozen garden apartments, they cannot be expected to develop
a new type of domitory design and finance the building of single pro-
jects with fifty to one hundred units. Most non-profit groups are ac-
customed to selling their projects or acting only as a rental collection
agency. They are not equipped to deal with the complicated managerial
problems involved with running low-income hotels with a central
kitchen.
157. See p. 418 supra.
158. See note 121 supra.
159. See pp. 419-20 supra.
160. See p. 419 supra,
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IV, Homeownership for SRO's
Even under the Uniform Relocation Act, SRO's may not receive
suitable relocation housing if they rely on the local renewal agency or
on the courts to enforce their legal rights. Even with the Moorhead Bill,
SRO's will probably not be housed if the decision to shelter them is
left to the discretion of public housing officials, the profit motives of
limited dividend corporations, or the good will of non-profit sponsors.
To assure suitable replacement housing for SRO's, Congress could
shift the burden of proof to the local renewal agencies in relocation
suits. To meet the shelter needs of SRO's effectively, Congress could
significantly change the existing housing programs. Congress could deal
with economic disincentives to housing SRO's by subsidizing a large
proportion of the operating expenses for public housing, greatly
increasing the appropriations for rent supplements, and making returns
on residential hotel construction competitive with other business op-
portunities. At the same time, Congress could eliminate the organiza-
tional barriers to SRO housing by requiring public housing boards run
by tenants, extending eligibility for rent supplements to all tenants in
one building, and paying for full-time staff to help non-profit groups
develop formidable projects like residential hotels.
But such large-scale changes seem politically infeasible in the near
future. For the time being, SRO's need a self-help approach that maxi.
mizes their own ability to enforce the legal requirement of standard
replacement housing and to construct or rehabilitate their own resi-
dences. For SRO's driven to this status by economic conditions or for
SRO's who like hotel-style living, such a self-help approach would be
feasible. While SRO's who are very sick or very old would probably not
be able to organize projects for themselves, these single men may best
be helped by expanded government medical or social welfare programs.
A self-help program for SRO relocation and homeownership would
follow the current government philosophy on aid to the disadvantaged.
Congress has already made clear that self-help is a major goal of the
anti-poverty legislation.161 The process of self-help is seen as the best
way for low-income persons to gain a sense of responsibility and com-
mitment to personal improvement. For similar reasons, Congress has
emphasized homeownership for the poor.10 2 Homeownership is con-
161. 42 US.C.A. § 2782(a)(3).
162. The main thrust of housing reform within the last few years has been toward
homeownership. To implement this goal, Congress passed the 1968 Housing and Urban
Development Act which increased subsidies for the purchase of individual homes,
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sidered the most effective method to develop good housekeeping prac-
tices and a stake in the neighborhood environment.
Self-help would be especially important to SRO's. If they were organ-
ized to obtain relocation benefits, SRO's for the first time would exert
influence on local policy. If SRO's built their own hotel, the building
would provide younger, healthier residents with a physical base around
which to organize politically. With their own property, SRO's would
achieve a measure of protection against present and future circum-
stances. Property creates an arena of privacy within which the owner
is relatively free to do as he wishes. 163 Since SRO's are often seen as
social deviants, property would give them a protected arena in which
they could live in their own unique style. Homeownership imposes an
obligation on the government to pay eminent domain costs. With their
own residences, SRO's could not be removed at the discretion of public
officials or private landlords.
The key to a successful self-help program is the $2000 down-payment
which the federal government gives all SRO's displaced by a renewal
or rehabilitation project under the Uniform Relocation Act.16 4 SRO's
have already been organized for various purposes by social workers, 6 5
who are much more receptive to their needs than city officials or private
landlords. With the incentive of such a large federal grant, SRO's could
be organized to pressure administrative officials. Pressure from com-
munity groups has been one of the key determinants in obtaining legal
benefits in the relocation process. 66 If SRO's are well-organized, they
condominiums, and cooperatives. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1715z-1. Congress even established a Na-
tional Homeownership Foundation to encourage and assist in the purchasing of resi-
dences. 12 U.5.C.A. § 1701y. For a discussion of the political history of homeownership
in recent housing legislation, see Sengstock & Sengstock, supra note 129, at 457-83.
163. See generally Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). Reich argues
that one of the main functions of property:
is to draw a boundary between public and private power. Property draws a circle
around the activities of each private individual or organization. Within that circle,
the owner has a greater degree of freedom than without. Outside, he must justify
or explain his actions, and show his authority. Within, he is master, and the state
must explain and justify any interference ....
Thus property performs the function of maintaining independence, dignity and
pluralism in society by creating zones within which the majority has to yield to the
owner. Whim, caprice, irrationality and "anti social" activities are given the pro-
tection of the law; the owner may do what all or most of his neighbors decry. The
Bill of Rights also serves this function, but while the Bill of Rights comes into play
only at extraordinary moments of conflict or crisis, property affords day-to-day pro-
tection in the ordinary affairs of life.
Id. at 771.
164. See p. 412 supra.
165. See Shapiro, supra note 4.
166. See Note, Family Relocation in Urban Renewal, 82 HAav. L. Rav. 864, 897-907
(1969).
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should be able to win a commitment of the $2000 down-payment to
finance their own building. 67
With working capital, a group of SRO's could achieve some form
of home-ownership as a cooperative under the federal 236 program,
under which low-income hotels can now be built. 68 After the hotel is
built, SRO's could decide whether to sell individual units to each
single man as a condominium under the 235 federal program for sub-
sidized homeownership. 160 Since cooperatives and condominiums have
different characteristics, the choice between forms of ownership can
reflect the social structure of each SRO group. 70 In a cooperative, each
SRO would have stock and an equal voting right in a housing cor-
poration which would own the building. In a condominium, each SRO
would have a property right only in his room and in an undivided
share of common space. If SRO's form a tightly-knit community with
pooled resources, then a cooperative should be used. If SRO's live in
a relatively atomized society with little financial interdependence,
then a condominium would be advisable.17'
167. SRO's have shown that they can run their own hotels if given the opportunity.
In San Francisco, for example, the United Filipino Association has leased the Interna-
tional Hotel to house low-income singles and elderly persons from the Filipino com-
munity. Although the hotel operation is well-run, the owners do not want to renew
the lease when it expires in about two years. See Fisher letter, note 54 supra.
168. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1715z-1(k); and The Moorhead Bill, § 114.
169. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1715z(i).
170. For a detailed comparison between these two forms of ownership, see Porhoryles,
The FHA Condominium: A Basic Comparison with the FHA Co-operative, 31 GEO. WASH.
L. R v. 1014 (1963); Miller, Cooperative Apartments: Real Estate or Securities? 45 BOSTON
U.L. Rav. 465 (1965); Quirk, Wein, and Gomberg, supra note 146; and Sengstock and
Sengstock, supra note 129, at 377-457.
171. In either program, SRO's would begin by forming a housing cooperative cor-
poration which would get a federal loan at no or low interest for preconstruction expenses
like planning and obtaining financing. 12 U.S.C.A. §1701x(b).
The corporation itself would receive federal insurance loan subsidies or outright grants
to construct or rehabilitate a low-income hotel. 12 U.S.C.A. § 170]x(b). In the 236
cooperative and 235 condominium programs, SRO's can construct or rehabilitate low-
income housing with mortgage subsidies down to a 1% interest rate. For rehabilitation
only, condominiums and cooperatives are eligible for loans of up to $10,000 per dwelling
unit at zero to 3% interest. 42 U.S.G.A. § 1452b; 12 U.S.C.A. § 1715k(h)(2)(i). Of
these loans, up to $15,000 per building and $2500 per dwelling unit may be insured bythe federal government. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1703(b).
Also, non-profit sponsors could rehabilitate hotels and transform them into 235 con-dominiums. But the buildings would have to be located in a "sufficiently stable" neigh-
borhood. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1715z()(n).
For a detailed discussion of all programs in the area of condominiums and cooperatives,
see Quirk & Wein, Homeownership for the Poor: Tenants Condominiums, the Housing
and Urban Development Act of 1968, and the Rockefeller Program, 54 CORNELL L. REv.
811 (1969).
After obtaining federal financing, the corporation could remain in operation as a
cooperative; or it could transfer ownership of individual units and a share of common
space to each SRO, thus forming a condominium. Since the 235(i) condominium program
requires existing units, SRO's would first have to form cooperatives. Then the cooperative
would transfer to each SRO his own unit and a share of common space under the 235(i)
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To carry out the complicated process of hotel construction, SRO's
obviously require the assistance of local lawyers. Since the federal
housing regulations are so complex, lawyers will have to act as technical
advisors to SRO's--describing the range of available programs, explain-
ing different types of communal ownership, and helping fill out appli-
cations for federal grants. 72 This type of technical assistance could be
provided free by lawyers from OEO or neighborhood legal services.
Lawyers from these organizations would be more likely to be sympa-
thetic to the needs of SRO's than either public officials or private
housing sponsors.
After low-income hotels are built, SRO's will need help in running
and maintaining the buildings. 73 SRO's dearly do not have any
experience in managing large projects, especially ones that require
central kitchens. At least for the first year of ownership, SRO's should
be able to contract for management services with groups like the
YMCA or university housing officers, who are familiar with the operat-
ing problems of domitory-type buildings. The cost of these services
should be paid for by the federal government in addition to the annual
interest subsidies.
The most serious barrier to an effective homeownership program for
SRO's is HUD. The department has a wide area of discretion in grant-
ing pre-construction loans, interest subsidies, and transfers of owmership;
it can promote or discourage the utilization of technical advisors by its
administrative regulations and computations of "appropriate" ex-
penses.174 Though federal officials are not generally involved with local
program, thus disbanding the cooperative. See Rental Housing for Low-Income Families,
10 HUD HANDBOOK FHA 4442.1 Oct., 1968.
In a cooperative, mortgage payments would be met by monthly rentals from all co-
operative members for the whole building. In a condominium, the mortgage would be
paid by each SRO for his unit plus a share of common space. With heavy federal financ-
ing, the default liability would be about the same for both forms of ownership. Tech-
nically, if one member of a cooperative cannot pay, the mortgage of the whole building
is defaulted. But in a heavily subsidized project, the government will not allow one per-
son to deprive all other members of their investments. Or the residents can insure them-
selves by contributing to a "slush fund" which would make payments for individuals who
were in financial trouble. Berger, Homeownership for Lower Income Families: The 196S
Housing Act's "Cruel Hoax," 2 CONN. L. REv. 30, 35 (1969).
172. For the potential role of lawyers, see EDSON, supra note 103.
173. Letter of May 18, 1970 from Associate Director, Program Policy and Research of
the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment officials to Representative Wil-
liam Moorhead.
174. For the preconstruction loan, HUD determines if the non-profit organization
meets the requirements of "financial responsibility and stability." 12 U.S.C.A. § 1701x(b)
(2). The Secretary of HUD has authority to set the time period and interest rate of the
loan; he can decide to cancel part or all of the loan at any time. 12 U.S.CA. § 1701x(b)(l).
At its discretion, HUD may contract with public or private groups to provide informa-
tion and technical assistance to sponsors of low or moderate income housing. 12 U.S.C.A.
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social prejudices or economic constraints, they have a bureaucratic
tendency to pass over applications from unusual or inexperienced
housing sponsors like SRO's.
To overcome possible bureaucratic barriers to a significant SRO
housing program, Congress should spell out clearly its preference for
some form of homeownership and the inclusion of technical advisors
as an appropriate expense. Further, Congress should broaden the
high-risk 237 program to include funds earmarked for low-income
hotels.175 Then despite their irregular credit and employment histories,
SRO's would clearly be eligible for the housing subsidies of at least one
federal program.
SRO's should not be forced to await major changes in government
shelter programs or in judicial housing doctrine. With appropriate
technical and legal advisors, SRO's could learn to help house them-
selves. Under a 237 program with larger appropriations, I-IUD would
be obligated to apply lenient guidelines in evaluating the applications
of SRO's for construction or rehabilitation of their own buildings. In
turn, the organizational strength derived from the formation of such
housing groups would allow SRO's effectively to pressure local agencies
on renewal plans and benefits.
§ 170Ix(a). When a cooperative housing project is designed under the 23G program for
multi-family dwellings, HUD may include such commercial and community facilitics "as
deemed adequate and appropriate to serve the occupants and surrounding neighborhood,
as long as the project is predominantly residential . . . ." Rental Housing, supra note 171,
at 6. Units built by cooperatives may be transformed into condominiums with the prior
approval of FHA. Id. at 10.
175. See p. 422 supra.
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